We have been asked to write a commentary on the articles on market reform appearing in this volume. Since we are economists, we concentrate on the articles by Evans and Rice, which directly address the application of economics to health policy. The Evans article attacks marketoriented reforms of health care systems. There are four elements to his argument: (1) A redistributive "rent-seeking" agenda lies behind support for market-oriented policies; (2) markets are not optimal for the production and distribution of health care; (3) government is; and (4) economic analysis is not applicable to health care, hence it is not useful and is actually harmful. Rice's article contains two intertwined but distinct themes. The first of these is an attack upon the application of a textbook model of perfect competition to the health care sector. The second is an attack upon several of the tools used by economists to study markets in general and health care markets in particular.
major problems in the articles: a misunderstanding or mischaracterization of the nature and implications of modern economics, in particular welfare economics and political economy; and flaws in the logical arguments, in particular logical inconsistencies and the use of ad hominem arguments, unsupported allegations, and innuendo. Additionally, both articles confuse ideology with analysis. The Evans article is particularly egregious in this regard. If analysis of health policy is to have any claim to objective scholarship, it is absolutely essential to make a serious, honest effort to separate the two. While some important issues have been raised in these articles, it remains for serious scholarship to grapple with them.
Our commentary is divided into three sections. Section 1 addresses the applicability of economics to health policy. While this theme is present in both articles, it is most extensively developed in the article by Rice, hence most of our comments in Section 1 are directed toward the arguments in this article. We address political economy in health care in Section 2. Since this issue is only raised by Evans, the comments in Section 2 are directed toward his article. Section 3 contains a summary and conclusions.
Economics and Health Policy
Both the Rice and Evans articles contain arguments seeking to show that the textbook model of perfect competition does not apply to the health care sector. This argument is clearly a straw man. The fact that health care markets are not textbook competitive markets is not news to economists. If Evans or Rice were to read almost any major economics textbook, they would find manifold descriptions of markets in which the assumptions of perfect competition fail, and analyses of policy options in the presence of market failure. Indeed, the vast bulk of work in health economics has been concerned with understanding the nature of markets for health care. The classic paper by Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow (1963) describes differences between markets for health care and textbook competitive markets, and goes on to analyze the implications for the workings of health care markets. The literature in health economics spawned by Arrow's paper has been concerned to a great extent with analyses of the types of market failure likely to occur in health care markets, and with potential policy options in the face of such failure. 1 Surely Rice and Evans cannot have failed to notice this.
It is worth mentioning, however, that there are results in economic theory which provide a set of sufficient (as distinct from necessary) conditions under which markets must be superior (in the sense of Pareto optimality described below) to any other institution for organizing economic affairs. 2 What this means is that if the assumptions of the textbook competitive model are truly satisfied, then it follows that markets are the optimal form of organizing economic activity. However, if a market is not textbook competitive, there is no implication about what the optimal organization of exchange might be. It might be pure government activity, it might be pure market activity, or it might be a mixture of the two.
In beating the perfect competition straw man, Rice also claims to be "cast [ing] doubt on the validity of various tools that health economists often use," and it is toward the validity of these tools that we direct our comments. In particular, Rice attacks the relevance of the Pareto criterion for evaluating alternative economic arrangements, and impugns economists' methods for assessing the preferences of consumers.
In performing evaluations, economists typically evaluate alternative means for organizing economic activity in terms of the Pareto principle. The Pareto principle says, in essence, that if every member of a society prefers one alternative, say A, to another alternative, say B, then A is better than B. To say that Sally prefers A to B is to say she would choose A over B were she to be faced with such a choice. So, the Pareto principle says that society prefers A to B if every member of society would choose A over B were each of them to be in a position to make the choice. A choice is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no other choice which would be preferred to it under the Pareto principle.
There are several important things to recognize about the Pareto principle. First, it will not always distinguish between two alternatives. For example, if Sally prefers A to B, but Bob prefers B to A, then the Pareto principle is silent on the question of which is best. The canonical example of an alternative on which the Pareto principle is silent is wealth distribution. If either Sally or Bob can own a piece of property, and Sally prefers that Sally own the property, and Bob prefers that Bob own the property, the Pareto criterion is silent on who should own it. Second (and relatedly), there are typically very many Pareto optimal choices, each with a different distribution of wealth. Third, the Pareto principle only tells us which of A and B is better from the point of view of the members of a society. If consuming music or Snickers bars is beneficial to society in the view of a social planner, but members of that society unanimously agree that they prefer not to consume the music or the Snickers bars, the Pareto principle will call for a lower consumption of music or Snickers bars than would the social planner. Fourth, the notion of preference as defined above depends only on how people would behave, rather than on some external measure of what is good for them. 3 Neither economists nor moral philosophers can claim consensus on what the "right" standard is for judging the social good, and progress in this area would obviously be welcome. It is worth pointing out that, contrary to Rice's innuendo, it is not only market advocates who use the Pareto criterion; supportive studies of socialism (Lange 1938; Lerner 1946 ) also use Pareto optimality in their evaluations.
Rice mounts a number of criticisms of the use of the Pareto principle in economics for evaluation purposes. First, he observes that economics, unlike other disciplines, is normative (i.e., it evaluates). It is not clear to us in what way an economist saying "trade barriers make everyone worseoff than . . ." is any more or less normative than an engineer saying "bridges made out of cardboard will fall down more frequently than . . ." Each is a technical statement and can be evaluated as such on its merits. A social planner may choose to build bridges of cardboard or erect trade barriers if those policies are preferred on nontechnical grounds.
A second criticism by Rice is that the Pareto criterion cannot take proper account of peoples' preferences over their relative rankings (status) in society. This is false, and his discussion on this point is confused. He asserts that "summing" over utilities in these models is inappropriate since status is a relative thing. In arguing for this point, however, he does what can only be interpreted as summing over utilities. When each person's utility is not influenced by any other person's consumption, the change in total utility from Rice buying a car is just the same as the change in Rice's utility. However, when status is important, the change in total utility when Rice buys a car includes both the gain to Rice's utility from the purchase, and the loss to someone else's utility generated by that person's envy. Thus, when status is important, the change to total utility from one consumer's action can only be calculated by summing over the effects of this consumer's action on everyone else's utilities. This appears to be nearly the opposite of what Rice argues. In fact there are economic models (e.g., Frank 1985; Akerlof 1995; Bernheim 1994; Varian 1974) in which relative rankings matter (this implies that distribution matters) and in which Pareto optima may be calculated. Indeed, Pareto optimum is the welfare criterion used in evaluating outcomes in these models.
Another criticism is that Pareto optima are not relevant when people have "sticky" preferences, and that perfect competition does not lead to good outcomes in such circumstances. By "sticky" preferences, we mean preferences which have the property that past consumption affects the relative desirability of current consumption, as Rice says: "wanting what you got." These sorts of dynamic effects in preferences are consistent with the standard textbook models of economic behavior, so that Pareto optima are well defined and have their usual interpretation. It is worth noting that the textbook competitive model deals with such preferences in both finite and infinite horizon models, and welfare economics' claims vis-à-vis the desirability of markets are unaffected by such concerns (Stokey and Lucas 1989: sections 5.11-5.13, 16.7, and references therein; Debreu 1979) .
Although the Pareto criterion remains applicable in the case of "sticky" preferences, Rice does raise a second issue here. Consider the case of a woman who, because she consumed cigarettes previously, is now addicted to them, and continues to consume them, say in order to stave off the symptoms of withdrawal. In the economist's usual conception of the Pareto criterion, these preferences "count" just as much as do any other preferences. Rice does not approve of the economist's decision on this count, and claims that the addict might be "better-off" if she is forced to stop smoking. No support is provided for this judgment, and it is far from obvious to us that the addict's pain of withdrawal is somehow less valid than any other motive for preference formation. It is possible to rigorously analyze issues of addiction and welfare (e.g., Pollak 1970 Pollak , 1976 Winston 1980; Schelling 1984; Becker and Murphy 1988) , but Rice has not done so.
A final theoretical criticism of Pareto optima from Rice is that the social planner may care about things in addition to or instead of Pareto optima. Rice says that a social planner may care about the quality of utilities, about wealth distribution, or about freedom, all in addition to or instead of Pareto rankings. Rice notes that what a social planner should care about is a philosophical issue, and goes on to point out other things which might motivate her. In moral philosophy, there appears not to be a consensus on what the appropriate objects are for the benevolent social planner to consider, and the "welfarist" position does have its defenders (e.g., Arneson 1990 ).
Rice does not make a case, however, for the irrelevance of Pareto rankings in social decision making. In fact, even a perfectly venal and totally self-interested social planner is compelled to consider the Pareto rankings of her subjects in pursuing her goals (McGuire and Olson 1996) . 4 If the point is merely that Pareto rankings are not the sole criterion for social choice, then it is hard to see with whom Rice argues, as this is something on which essentially all economists agree. If his point is that Pareto rankings are irrelevant, this simply does not follow from the arguments presented, and, indeed, other critics of the Pareto criterion have been careful to avoid the claim that preferences (and thus the Pareto criterion) are irrelevant to social choice (e.g., Sen 1982: 363-364) .
Rice also makes an empirical criticism of the Pareto criterion. He claims that governments do not appear to follow the Pareto criterion in making health policy. Suppose one accepts the assertion. It is unclear how this bears on the validity of Pareto rankings. Observing that political choices do not appear to follow the Pareto criterion does not tell us that it is useless, but simply that there are other factors affecting political decisions. This is hardly surprising.
There is also a confusion here, and in the Evans article, between is and ought. There is no obvious reason to believe that observing what a particular government does with regard to health policy reveals what is socially optimal. Evans claims that the forms of health systems adopted by western European countries and Canada are optimal (or superior) (e.g., the "general consensus" on the "international standard" for health care systems, p. 437). This may or may not be true, but taking observations on what "is" as evidence of what "ought" only makes sense if it is known that the political process in those countries leads to the adoption of socially optimal health policies. Evans's trenchant criticism of the susceptibility of policy making to rent seeking by special interests is in direct contradiction to this view. Further, it is difficult to see how anyone possessed of a nodding familiarity with modern political economy or even with the history of the twentieth century would accept such an assumption. We elaborate on issues of political economy in the next section.
Pareto optimality may not be the exclusive criterion one might use in assessing forms of economic organization, but it is likely to be a relevant criterion both to a hypothetical benevolent social planner and to any real social planner. This is the case for both philosophical and practical reasons. Making everyone better off by their own lights may not be the exclusive criterion for good social policy, but exclusivity is not what is required. A benevolent social planner need only be partially concerned with making her citizens better off by their own lights in order for her to want to use Pareto rankings as part of her decision making.
For practical purposes, calculation of Pareto rankings is also useful. First of all, for whatever goal the social planner is pursuing, knowledge of the structure of Pareto rankings is likely to be of great use, since policies leading to Pareto improvements are likely to lead to a larger amount of resources from which to finance whatever goal the planner pursues (McGuire and Olson 1996) . Second, a social policy which is not Pareto optimal leaves gains from trade unrealized, or "left on the table." Private mechanisms frequently arise to realize these gains. To use a standard example, the food stamp program forces some recipients to consume more food than they would prefer to consume were they just given cash. This means that the policy is not Pareto optimal, for we could make everyone better-off, by their own lights, were we to give the recipients cash (or to permit them to trade their food stamps for cash). But the possibility of this gain from exchange is realized in the real world, as there is an active black market for food stamps. So, policy which ignores Pareto rankings and which thereby leaves gains from trade "on the table" may bring about private actions directed toward realizing these gains and which work at cross-purposes to the policy.
Although it is not made explicit, Rice does provide some hint as to what his vision of social choice might entail. As Rice points out, the Pareto criterion typically would not endorse in-kind transfers to the poor. An in-kind transfer means providing a person with goods, like food (or food stamps), or housing, or health insurance, rather than providing him with the cash equivalent and letting him choose whether or not to purchase the good.
In arguing for providing the poor with free health care rather than with an equivalent amount of money with which they could choose to purchase health care or to purchase something else, Rice says, "[cash payments] would lower the welfare of a society where people feel better knowing that the poor can receive health care services" (our emphasis). Before commenting on this proposal, we undo the rhetorical sleight of hand embodied in the word can. The poor can buy health services (or health insurance) under either the cash transfer or the in-kind transfer policies. The difference between the two is that under the in-kind transfer the poor must either consume the health services or nothing. Society, in Rice's example, does not care about either the preferences of the poor or about whether the poor can purchase health care, for both of these goals are served as well or better by the cash transfer. Rather, society cares about the amount of health services consumed by the poor, regardless of their preferences. 5 Let's consider an example to illustrate the costs of such a policy choice. Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) is a frequently performed and expensive surgical procedure. It costs (roughly) $25,000, and in some subpopulations, many CABGs are performed in cases where the primary or only benefit is the relief of the pain of angina (it does not prolong life in some groups) (see Leape et al. 1991) . Obviously, no one disputes that the relief of pain is a worthy goal, to be pursued for rich and poor alike. But consider a poor person covered by Rice's compulsory medical insurance scheme. To most Americans $25,000 is a great deal of money (the median family income in the United States in 1994 was $32,264), and it is easy to imagine that some people with income substantially below this figure would wish to have the money to pursue some personal goal, rather than to receive the reduced pain. 6 The Pareto criterion calls for the poor person to be paid the money, which she can either use to buy the surgery or for some other purpose. Rice's plan calls for her to receive the surgery. The in-kind transfer makes this person worse-off (according to her own assessment) than does the cash transfer. It is not our purpose to argue that the Pareto criterion makes the right choice here, but to point out that deviations from Pareto optimality always entail frustrating someone's preferences, someone whose preferences we could satisfy at no cost to anyone else. In many practical applications, such as this one, it is the poor who bear the brunt of this inefficiency, since they are more often the target and are less often in a position to escape government policy. Now, under some scheme of social choice, it may in fact be better to deny this hypothetical consumer her preferred outcome. But to make an argument for this scheme, it is surely incumbent upon the proponent to face the problem squarely, and not to hide musts behind cans.
To calculate Pareto rankings, it is necessary to measure consumer preferences. The method favored by most economists is to infer what people prefer from what they actually choose. In the simplest case, where a consumer buys an apple at a price of $1, we infer that the apple is worth at least $1 to the consumer. If the consumer does buy the apple at a price of $1, but refrains at a price of $1.01, we infer that the apple is worth exactly $1 to the consumer.
One might imagine estimating preferences in other ways. To find the value of an apple to a consumer, we might simply ask him what he would be willing to pay for an apple. Alternatively, we could try to measure happiness directly and then try to correlate happiness with apple consumption to infer how much happiness an apple generates. Both Evans and Rice evidently are of the opinion that such methods are desirable, as both use them to bolster various arguments; however, Rice is of divided sentiment on the point, accepting relatively uncritically the international comparisons of happiness presented in Easterlin 1974, but regarding with skepticism the value of satisfaction surveys in comparing different health plans.
Most economists are skeptical of measuring preferences in either of these ways. The first approach is sometimes used (as in contingent valuation in environmental economics), but is regarded with considerable caution for several reasons. First, people responding to surveys typically have very poor incentives to tell the truth or to think carefully about the questions. There may even be systematic biases toward deception (see Kuran 1995; Bjornstad and Kahn 1996; Hausman 1993 ). An amusing example can be found in the responses of Americans to surveys about whether or not they vote. About 50 percent of eligible Americans turn out to vote in presidential elections, but if we believed what Americans tell people conducting surveys, we would conclude that turnout must be 15 percent to 20 percent greater than this. About 15 percent to 20 percent more people say they vote than actually do (Seppa 1996 )! Second, survey questions necessarily leave out details which would affect actual choices ("How much would you be willing to pay for a pound of steak?" leaves out the type, quality, age, fat content, etc.).
The second approach, directly measuring happiness or satisfaction, suffers from all the defects of the first, but also suffers from problems of comparability among individuals. What happy means is likely to vary from person to person, from culture to culture, and from time to time, and has no obvious physical referent. The responses are contextual, and made relative to an often unsolicited reference point for the individual. One example of this difficulty is presented in Freeman and Medoff 1984. When workers are asked about job satisfaction, union members indicate significantly greater dissatisfaction with their jobs, relative to similar nonunion employees. Nonetheless, it is also true that union members would require significantly more pay to accept nonunion jobs. These two findings are inconsistent, casting doubt on any straightforward interpretation of the measures of satisfaction. It is hard to know what, if anything at all, can be learned from comparing measures of happiness across people, let alone countries. As Rice notes, the usual economic approach to assessing preferences also has potential problems. His primary point, raised repeatedly in various guises, is that a consumer operating under imperfect information about the product he is considering may make choices which are not easily interpreted in terms of his fully informed preferences. The world is not always so simple as our example of the apple above. Perhaps not all apples are the same; perhaps there are good apples worth $1.50 and bad apples worth $0.50 to the fully informed consumer, but perhaps the consumer cannot tell the difference before buying them. If (say) the consumer assesses a 50 percent chance that the apple is a good one and a 50 percent chance that it is a bad one, he may be willing to pay $1 for the apple. In this case, the consumer's choice does not tell us about his fully informed preferences for apples, but it tells us about a mixture between his true preferences and his assessment of the likely quality of apples. Notice, though, that his choice does tell us something. It tells us that he expects to get at least $1 worth of satisfaction from his apple purchase. It is also not clear that there is any social welfare problem here. People make decisions under uncertainty all the time, and by necessity some will turn out badly ex post. That does not imply, however, that the individual could have, or should have, done anything differently ex ante. Unless information can be improved ex ante, bad outcomes ex post do not render observed ex ante decisions bad decisions. 7 Another potential problem Rice raises is the possibility of some indi-rect effect. If, for example, our hypothetical consumer's parents are apple growers, he may consume apples not out of some preference for apples per se, but because he believes his parents will regard him more poorly if he does not. Rice also raises the problem of externalities in consumption, which can lead to incorrect assessments of Pareto rankings if they are not recognized. Although these are clearly important limitations of standard demand theory, they are also widely recognized by economists. Furthermore, they do not justify blanket condemnation of demand theory. Detecting circumstances in which these problems arise and inferring "primitives" (like preferences for consumers, and costs for firms) from observed market behavior in conditions such as these are areas of active research and progress in economics. As a single example, great progress has been made over the last twenty years in drawing inferences concerning the structure of costs, demand, and the nature of competition only from market data on prices and quantities (Bresnahan 1989 ; see also Reiss 1996) . Keeler (1995) and McClellan (1995) provide analyses of the effects and implications of imperfect information for demand and welfare analysis in the health care sector. Rice also presents an empirical analysis which he believes poses a significant challenge to the usual interpretation and use of demand analysis. It does not. This particular example has been published before (Rice 1992 ) as a part of an extended exchange regarding the meaning of demand curves for health services (Feldman and Dowd 1991; Rice 1992; Feldman and Dowd 1993; Rice 1993a; Peele 1993; Rice 1993b; Keeler 1995; McClellan 1995) . Although Rice's position has been adequately refuted in that exchange, we repeat and augment the criticisms. Rice analyzes data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) reported in Lohr et al. 1986 . The HIE was a social experiment in which consumers were assigned randomly to health insurance plans with different deductibles and coinsurance rates. Rice's reasoning is as follows: When price rises, demand theory asserts that consumers will reduce their consumption, beginning with the units of a commodity yielding the least marginal (additional) utility. In Lohr and colleagues' study, when faced with an increased rate of coinsurance, consumers reduced their consumption, but reduced their consumption of "highly effective" services by the same amount that they reduced their consumption of "less effective" services. Thus, Rice contends, demand theory is falsified.
This reasoning is wrong for several reasons. First, demand theory claims that units yielding the least marginal utility will be foregone when price rises. To the extent that the highly effective and least effective categories have any economic interpretation at all, they are about the average utility of the services consumed within each category of procedures. 8 Even if one grants the identity of marginal and average utility 9 of services, it is far from clear that standard demand theory predicts what Rice claims. The experiment considered is not a price change but a change in coinsurance. When the coinsurance rate rises, it is not the units with the smallest marginal utility which are foregone first, but the units with the smallest marginal utility net of price. That is, a high-marginal utility, high-price item may be forgone in favor of a low-marginal utility, low-price item. Consequently, the observations on the ways in which consumers reduce their consumption of medical care in the HIE (at least as presented) do not support Rice's assertion.
The test Rice constructs is not objectionable on theoretical grounds alone, however. Demand theory predicts the behavior of individual patients vis-à-vis what they consume, and it is questionable whether the procedure used to categorize services as highly effective and least effective reveals anything about the marginal utility of various services to individual patients. The categorizations of "highly effective" and "less effective" care were made after the fact by physicians who did not examine the relevant patients, and who did not know the history of the relevant patients. Furthermore, there was not agreement among the physicians categorizing the services as to the categories to which they belong (Lohr et al. 1986; Newhouse 1993: chap. 5 ). While Rice may find it "logical that consumers would prefer those services that are thought to be the most effective," others may find it logical that consumers disregard the after-the-fact, non-unanimous opinions of people who do not know them or their history, who have never examined them, and who have no 486 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 8. To illustrate the difference between marginal and average utility, consider how much a glass of water is worth to a thirsty man. If he has no water at all, the first glass may be worth a great deal to him, perhaps $10. After having consumed the first glass, his thirst is somewhat reduced and the second glass is worth only $1. If he is consuming two glasses of water currently, their average utility to him is ($10 + $1)/2 = $5.50. The marginal benefit of the first glass (relative to nothing) is $10, and the marginal benefit of the second glass (relative to only one) is $1. To see why marginal and not average utility is the right thing to look at, suppose the price of water is $1.50. This is clearly less than the average benefit of two glasses of water, since the average benefit is $5.50. However, the thirsty man will not buy two glasses of water! Why not? Since the second glass is worth only $1 to him, he would be better-off (by $0.50) consuming only the first glass. The relevance of marginal and not average utility for choosing consumption is a very general proposition in economics, and for one formalization of this distinction in the example of health care demand see Peele 1993 and references therein.
9. Specifically, for purposes of the following discussion, assume that each service contributes some fixed amount of utility for consumption of the first unit, and no utility for consumption of subsequent units. strong incentives to think carefully about which treatment is best for them.
Unsurprisingly, Lohr and colleagues interpret their results with more caution than does Rice. They note the great breadth of their service definitions, and point out that their methodology may falsely lead to a finding of no differential response if there are errors in classification of services to categories, if there is substantial heterogeneity in patients' valuations of health status, or if there is substantial heterogeneity in the effectiveness of medical treatment among patients. Obviously, these are empirical issues, but Rice's position depends upon these heterogeneities not being important. This does not exhaust the list of problems with Rice's interpretation of the results, however. The measure, as constructed by Lohr and colleagues, counts only whether a consumer sought care. Seeking care one time, two times, or one hundred times are each counted the same. Also, the amount of care sought in each visit is not considered. If the differential demand effect operated along either of these dimensions, the cited study would not be able to detect it.
In another HIE study, O'Grady et al. (1985) found that the effect of higher copayments on emergency room use was to reduce use of the emergency room for "less urgent" diagnoses more than it did for "more urgent" diagnoses. Obviously, for all the reasons we discuss above, this study is no more evidence for demand theory than Lohr and colleagues' findings are a refutation of it; it serves only to show that the result Rice relies upon is not robust, since the results of this study go in the direction which Rice would presumably interpret as validating the standard theory. Although Rice's evidence is weak indeed for the falsification of standard demand theory, there is evidence from the health insurance experiment bearing on the subject. What other evidence from the HIE is there? Adopting an argument from Feldman and Dowd (1993) , if consumers do reduce their consumption of effective care, we should expect to see some deterioration in their health status, relative to consumers who do not. What evidence is there for this in the health insurance experiment? When people's coinsurance rates were increased, they reduced their consumption of health services significantly, but their health outcomes were not changed (Newhouse 1993: chaps. 3, 4, 6) . 10 This is not conclusive evi-10. Of thirty-two measures of health status, thirty showed no difference between consumers receiving free care and those paying coinsurance. Only two measures showed significant (at 5 percent) changes due to different health insurance levels. Since we would expect between one and two rejections out of thirty-two tests at the 5 percent level, this constitutes no evidence that higher coinsurance causes people to forgo valuable (by these conventional measures) health dence in favor of consumer rationality, but it is consistent with that theory and inconsistent with Rice's hypothesis. 11 In defending the use of Pareto optimality and of demand analysis in health economics, we do not claim that these tools are perfect, free of error, and incapable of improvement. However, demand analysis represents the best tool currently available for assessing people's preferences over economic alternatives, and if we wait to use it until the tool is perfect, we will surely wait forever. Neither is the Pareto criterion the only basis for social choice. No economist we are aware of claims that Pareto optimality is a fit candidate for the sole criterion of social choice, and an examination of any introductory microeconomics textbook should dispel any misapprehension on this score. 12 The Pareto criterion is useful in decision making for any hypothetical social planner who has any regard for satisfying the preferences of her charges, and for any actual policy maker whose activities are goal oriented.
Political Economy
An important aspect of the Evans article is the emphasis on the political economy of health policy. Self-interested attempts to affect government policy are certainly present in health, as they are with respect to other policies. This sort of analysis is present in health economics, but more is certainly called for. 13 While Evans is to be commended for drawing attention to these issues, the presentation in the article is strangely unbalanced and is therefore unconvincing.
In summarizing his article, Evans states that the short message of the 488 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law care services. Also, Newhouse (1993) points out that the effects (or lack thereof) of coinsurance on health status are measured precisely, so that these tests are likely quite powerful. 11. In a previous response to this argument, Rice (1993b) made recourse to the following line of reasoning (which he adopted from Lohr et al. (1986) . If the reduction in highly effective services was accompanied by a precisely offsetting decline in the use of actually harmful ineffective services, then there might be no effect on health outcomes. Beyond pointing out that this explanation is both speculative and would require an amazing and convenient coincidence, little can be said.
12. The obligatory discussion of Edgeworth's Box, for example, explicitly demonstrates the lack of perfect congruence between competition and Pareto optima and distributional issues.
13. For example, see Feldstein 1988 on the political economy of health legislation; Friedman and Kuznets 1954; Friedman 1962; Kessel 1958 Kessel , 1970 Leffler 1978; Rayack 1967; Shaked and Sutton 1981 on physician control of medical education and licensure; and Joskow 1981 , Posner 1974 , Sloan and Steinwald 1980 , and Salkever and Bice 1976 on hospital certificate of need regulation. Evans claims that professional self-regulation has disappeared from the consciousness of most of those who approach health systems from a market perspective. As indicated by the above citations, this is clearly incorrect. piece is that there are powerful redistributional motives behind part of the health care reform agenda; that much analysis, particularly by economists, misdirects attention by assuming these issues away; and that competition and market mechanisms generally are particularly suited to facilitating and concealing the process of redistribution.
There are four major flaws with the arguments presented in the article. First, as indicated previously, the analysis is incomplete. Evans only considers the political economy of rent seeking by private beneficiaries of market-oriented policies (he uses the term redistributional motives). 14 He ignores, however, the political economy of public system-oriented policies. Further, he only analyzes rent seeking, when there are many other potential sources for government failure. Second, he misrepresents modern economic analysis and the uses to which it can be put. Third, he employs conspiracy theories and ad hominem arguments in attempting to make his case. Fourth, he employs unsupported assertions to back his argument. In what follows we review these flaws in turn.
The study of political economy in economics derives from a long tradition of trying to understand the role and limitations of government in the economy (see Schumpeter 1954 for an intellectual history). This analysis arises from two fundamental observations. First, there is an essential interdependence between the economy and the polity of a country. Neither economic activity nor politics occurs independently of one another. Second, this interdependence will lead individuals to try to influence policy to their own benefit. Private interest groups will try to influence policy to increase their economic gains (these are referred to by economists as economic rents, hence the term rent seeking). In the public sector, politicians and bureaucrats will try to influence the economy in ways that achieve their objectives (e.g., political power), which are not necessarily consistent with society's.
Modern political economy analyzes the workings of political processes in determining policy, and is a key part of modern economics. 15 This approach explicitly recognizes that the political process is subject to imperfections, either due to attempts by private or public individuals or interest groups to manipulate politics to their own advantage, or due to the inability of any political process to fully represent every individual's preferences.
In particular, the need for political economic analysis arises from the recognition that there is governmental failure as well as market failure. Governmental failure can arise for a number of reasons. One is simply due to the lack of feasible mechanisms to implement optimal collective decisions (e.g., Arrow 1951; Sen 1970) . A simple example of this is collective choice of a policy by referendum decided by majority rule. Even if preferences over the policy are distributed such that majority rule results in a unique equilibrium, it can still be a suboptimal collective choice, since the preferences of the minority are not represented (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) . Another reason is rent seeking, or attempts at self-aggrandizement. Rent seeking on the part of special interest groups can lead to distortions in policy choices (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974) . Additionally, this process results in costs from attempting to influence policy that are socially wasteful (see Mueller 1989: chap. 13 for a useful survey on rent seeking). Another reason is the failure of government bureaucracy to be responsive to social objectives (e.g., Niskanen 1971) .
Evans discusses at length how rent seeking can influence and distort the process of policy making with regard to market reform. However, he entirely neglects any distortions in a public sector -dominated system. This is logically inconsistent. If governments and policy making are susceptible to rent seeking over one policy, this must be true for other policies. In the case of a public sector -dominated health system, the rentseekers will be those who benefit from such a system, including government employees and private firms and individuals to whom rents flow. This is simply Evans's analysis of rent seeking in market reforms applied to public systems.
Further, as indicated above, there are more potential sources of government failure than rent seeking. Political processes do not necessarily work well even without attempts by special interests to influence policy to their advantage, either because of problems with representation or bureaucratic performance. There is simply no consideration or justification in the paper for focusing on only one potential source of government failure.
The second claim made by Evans is that "much analysis, particularly by economists, misdirects attention by assuming these issues away." We find this statement mysterious. As we stated in the previous section, positive economic analysis is a necessary contribution to a policy decision, regardless of one's policy goals. Further, economics as a discipline can hardly be accused of ignoring issues of political economy. We agree that more rigorous political economic analyses of health policy are called for, but that hardly implies that positive economic analyses of health care are useless or misleading. Quite the opposite is true. Just as analyses of efficiency alone are not sufficient for making policy, neither are analyses of redistribution in isolation.
The third major flaw in the paper is the use of conspiracy theories and ad hominem arguments. In a number of places Evans refers to "covert" motives behind market-oriented reforms (see p. 430, for instance), or pretenses that health can be organized as a market "serves to draw a veil over the activities of those who do in fact exercise power, and to screen them from public accountability for its use" (p. 432). This sort of verbiage alleges -without attempting to document, let alone prove-that there is some sort of nefarious conspiracy behind market-oriented reforms. It may be that there is some sort of conspiracy to support Evans's allegations. Nonetheless, conspiracy theories, unless carefully documented, are undesirable methods for logical argumentation, because they cannot be refuted. These allegations are also a form of ad hominem attack, in that they imply that arguments in favor of market-oriented reforms can be (conveniently) dismissed in toto, without any consideration, due to the (unsupported) allegation that anyone making such arguments must be a member of some mysterious cabal.
Evans also divides participants in health policy debates into two groups: fundamentalists and instrumentalists. Fundamentalists are defined as those who hold certain forms of economic organization to be good per se, while instrumentalists are interested in policies as a means to an end. Whether an individual is a fundamentalist or an instrumentalist is as irrelevant to the validity of their argument as is the color of their hair. Surely the sky is no less blue because (pick your favorite villain here) claims it is so. Analyses of health policy must be evaluated by the validity and strength of the analysis, not by the identity of the analyst.
We claim no knowledge with regard to whether market mechanisms are particularly well suited to facilitating and concealing the process of redistribution, as claimed by Evans. However, it is not obvious to us whether this is true, or whether markets or government are more susceptible to such covert actions. Again, this is simply an unsupported assertion, so it is not possible to evaluate the validity of the claim.
The last problem in general is the pervasive use of unsupported assertions. The article is rife with them. We only mention a few here. Figure  2 contains data points from eleven different countries on 1989 per capita health spending and the proportion of survey respondents indicating that the health system works well. There are no statistical tests performed nor any statistics reported other than the country-specific means in the figure. Evans concludes, "More spending leads to more satisfaction. The United States is different-and Americans are not happy about it." These assertions may or may not be true, but they simply cannot be tested with the data reported by Evans in Table 2 . As mentioned previously, it is hard to know what to make of the responses to the questions about how well a country's health system works. There are many alternative interpretations of the observed responses, of which Evans's is only one.
However, even if Evans's interpretation of the satisfaction measure is correct, it seems unlikely that his hypothesis can be tested in any meaningful way with only eleven data points. 16 As an example, we regressed the data for per capita health spending (spending) on the proportion reporting the system works well (satisfaction). 17 The satisfaction level for the United States falls within the 70 percent prediction interval for the regression, meaning that satisfaction in the United States does not differ in a statistically significant way from what we would predict from its level of spending. 18 This does not imply that the relationship between health spending and satisfaction is the same for the United States as for the other countries; rather it implies that there is so much noise in the data that no statistically valid inferences can be drawn from them. While the pattern in Figure 2 may look interesting, the data simply cannot be examined in a scientifically meaningful way.
On p. 439 Evans asserts, "Nobody pretends that other countries do not have substantial problems with their health care systems. But they are typically problems that most Americans would be very relieved to have to face." Not only is this is a completely unsupported assertion, but we find it astounding that Evans claims to know what health care problems "most Americans" would like to face.
On the same page he claims, "The record of the last forty years seems to show that the United States took the wrong road in trying to rely on private action to organize and finance health care. The rest of us groped our way to what now seems to be a reasonably satisfactory road." This amounts to proof by assertion, and in two sentences, no less! These statements reveal Evans's opinions, but nothing more.
492 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 16. If standard errors of the means had been reported, it would have been possible to test for significant differences and to perform power calculations.
17. The regression results were: Satisfaction = 0.33 (2.37) -0.0000124 (-0.12) , R2 = 0.0016, F(1,9) = 0.014. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
18. The actual value of satisfaction for the United States is 0.1; the value predicted by the regression is 0.304, and the 70 percent prediction confidence interval is [0.091,0.52]. The interval gets wider, of course, for greater degrees of confidence. It is [-0.13,0 .74] at the 95 percent confidence level, for example.
In regard to the nature of the market for health care services, Evans states that "supply creates its own demand" (p. 442) and "the direct impact of capacity on use is one of the most solidly grounded empirical relationships in health economics" (p. 443). This is simply Evans's opinion. Whether there is any relationship between capacity and use is in fact the single most controversial topic in health economics. There is a great diversity of opinion among health economists on this matter, and a great deal of evidence claimed as support on both sides of the issue (Fuchs 1996; Feldman and Morrisey 1990; Feldman and Sloan 1988) . It is inaccurate and misleading to state this as fact rather than as personal opinion.
In regard to the relation between expenditures on health services and providers' incomes, he states, "more expenditure always yields an increase in incomes" (p. 443). There is no logical requirement that this be true. Simply put, more expenditures on services can lead to greater incomes for providers, or the same or lower incomes, depending on the number of providers and the nature of the market for provider services. A scholarly study of rent seeking and the political economy of health policy must clearly establish that there is self-interest sufficient to generate rent-seeking behavior.
The true, and truly important, question of political economy in health care remains. In an imperfect world, which implies both market failure and government failure, what are optimal health policies? While this question is critical, and subject to careful and honest scholarly analysis, it has not been addressed by Evans's article. Evans's efforts are useful in raising the general issue of the political economy of health policy, but his analysis is so severely flawed that it can only be regarded as opinion, not as scholarly inquiry.
Summary and Conclusions
We have commented on the attempts in the Evans and Rice articles to discredit the use of economic analysis in health policy. As indicated, we feel that the arguments in both articles are subject to so many factual and logical flaws that they do not advance the debate. This does not mean, however, that we feel the issues raised in the articles are irrelevant or settled. There is much room for improvement in economics and in the application of economics to health care, including developing more comprehensive tools for welfare economics and more extensive research in the political economy of health policy. We welcome a rigorous and informed scholarly discourse on these topics.
